2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise the military and economic potential of the Center and to compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

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231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	30.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

141 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[57]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[57] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

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TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

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	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	—	—	37	60	—	42	—	—	40	150	—	46
Flax	28	109	22	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	10
Hemp	5	13	28	—	—	108	—	19	—	—	—	50
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	—	20	—	—	—	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence.

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The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[28] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[28] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only suggestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land, market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.
[40] *Part i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.
[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 28, 1953.
[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

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industrial crops. In 1953, 75 per cent of the nation's cotton and 84 per cent of its sugar beets were produced in the "Socialist sector."[43]

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POLAND

Communist authorities in Poland have frequently asserted the superior productivity of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. But since the claims so frequently contradict each other and contradict general claims concerning the productive capacity of the entire sector, they must be treated cautiously. For example, although the Communists have, at various times, claimed from 15 to 20 per cent greater yield per hectare for collective farms, they do not claim a higher proportionate yield for the sector as a whole.[44]

On the central question of the deliveries made by the two sectors, statistics are equally uncertain. In the year 1950, the Communists seemed confident of the superior capacity of the "Socialist sector" to market its grain. The statistics in Table 28 seem to bear out this confidence.

TABLE 28

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND IN 1950*

	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat	Rye
Production Cooperatives	67.0	49.0	31.4
Private Farms	34.3	34.3	28.7

* *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952), p. 132.

And in 1951 the regime claimed that the "Socialist sector," comprising only 15 per cent of the land, accounted for 23.2 per cent of the marketed grain, while the private sector, comprising 85 per cent of the land, accounted for only 76.8 per cent of the marketed grain. According to these reports, both State Farms and collectives contributed far more than their proportionate share to the market.[45]

However, there is reason to doubt the validity of these statistics. The marketing report in 1953 shows the "Socialist sector" in a

[43] *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 2, 1953.
[44] For example, according to *Wies w Liczbach* (1952), the productive cooperatives have an approximately 20 per cent higher yield than the individual holdings. But other regime statistics indicate that the total produce of the productive cooperatives is no greater — per hectare — than the individual holdings.
[45] *Wies w Liczbach* (1952).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	—	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wies w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

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FARM PRODUCTION and MARKETING IN POLAND – BY SECTOR*

– 1952 –

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



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But if the State Farms exceed independent farms in grain marketing, the so-called kulaks exceed even the State Farms. With only 11.1 per cent of the arable land, they account for 19 per cent of the marketed grain. Precisely for this reason the Polish economist, Jerzy Tepicht, in an article published in December 1953, warned against the "irresponsible policy of destroying the productive capacity" of the kulaks.[46] If the kulaks cannot be broken, the regime must cooperate with them or risk an agricultural crisis such as occurred in Hungary in 1953.

The same Tepicht, in an article on the general problem of marketing, tried to establish the thesis that State Farms had come to play the same role in marketing that had formerly been held by large landowners.[47] In pre-war times the large landowners, holding 18.1 per cent of the land, contributed 29.9 per cent of the total marketed grain. Today, the State Farms, holding 12 per cent of the arable land, deliver 21.2 per cent of the marketed grain. Tepicht concludes that the marketing ability of the State Farms equals that of the pre-war landed estates, and thereby justifies the existence of the State Farms. The only flaw in his argument – aside from the peculiarity of such a justification on the part of a Communist! – lies in the fact that the majority of the State Farms (73.7 per cent) are in the Western territories where private farms also deliver high grain surpluses to the market. Holding only 31.1 per cent of the arable land, private farmers in the Western territories market 65.4 per cent of the grain delivered by the private sector in all Poland.[48] It seems likely, therefore, that the superior marketing power of the State Farms is due as much to their geographical location as to their internal structure.

In addition, it should be noted that the State Farms have established their grain marketing record at the cost of a very poorly developed livestock, a condition which they have in common with the collectives. Whereas the small farmers, with 11.5 per cent of the arable land, possess 20 per cent of the pigs and cows, and all the independent farms, with 76.5 per cent of the arable land, raise 93.1 per cent of the cattle and 90.1 per cent of the pigs, the State Farms, with 12 per cent of the land, raise only 9.2 per cent of the

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[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) December 31, 1953.
[47] *Ekonomista*, III, 1953, pp. 31-2.
[48] *Ibid*, p. 35. Tepicht's figures differ from those given above (Table 29) but the difference is slight, and either set would support his argument.

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pigs and six per cent of the cows. The kolkozes, with over six per cent of the land, raise less than one per cent of the cattle, pigs, and sheep. [49] The neglect of livestock is evidently characteristic of large-scale farming in Poland since the kulaks, who also produce a high marketable surplus, have also had negligible success in animal husbandry.

Despite these modifications, the State Farms have played a sizeable role in establishing the Communist-desired relationship between the town and country. It is also clear that, up to this point, the collectivized sector has played a very limited role.

Czechoslovakia

The data relating to sector-by-sector marketing in Czechoslovakia is, unfortunately, even more scattered than in Poland, and permits less conclusive inferences. For example, it is known that in 1950 the State purchased 46 per cent of the grain production of both sectors, collective and private. It is also known that in 1949 the farms of less than 10 hectares—virtually all the private sector—contributed only 33 per cent of their production to the State.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that the "Socialist sector"—mostly State Farms in 1949, but including a large number of collectives in 1950—contributed a higher portion of its produce than did the private farms. Furthermore, in 1951 farms of under 10 hectares accounted for only 39 per cent of grain deliveries, so that presumably the larger farms contributed more than their proportionate share of the market.[51]

In 1953, according to official Czechoslovak statistics, the "Socialist sector," comprising over 50 per cent of the land, accounted for 51 per cent of the marketed grain, 46 per cent of the marketed cattle, 57 per cent of the marketed pigs, and 43 per cent of the marketed milk.[52] These figures suggest that the market benefits gained by the Czechoslovak State are quite modest, and frequent claims that the collectives fulfill quotas more fully than the private

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1953; Jan Wyrozebski, Radio Warsaw, January 22, 1954.

[50] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague) February 22, 1951.

[51] *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November, 1953. The farms under 10 hectares, comprising 51 per cent of the arable land, contributed only 39 per cent of the marketed grain while the collective farms in 1951, holding 19 per cent of the land, contributed 20.7 per cent of the marketed grain.

[52] *Zprava Statniho Uradu Statistickeho* (Prague), January 31, 1954.

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433 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater confidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[131] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

HUNGARY

423 433 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

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TABLE 31

PRE-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

Sector	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Crop	Percent of Own Crop Marketed	Percent of Total Marketed
Small Holdings (Under 25 cad. acres)	94.0	48	51.6	47.2	43.6
Medium Holdings (25-200 cad. acres)	5.5	28	24.2	63.6	27.4
Large Holdings (Over 200 cad. acres)	0.5	24	24.2	67.0	29.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.9	100.0

* *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv*, (Budapest, 1948), p. 103; *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953; *Hungarian State Yearbook*, Special Agricultural Issue (Budapest, 1935).

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TABLE 32

POST-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*
1949 - 1952

Sector	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Grain Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total Grain Delivery
1949				
Working peasants' farms	75.5	82.1	38.3	75.3
Kulak farms	17.0	16.4	59.9	23.5
Socialist sector	7.5	1.5	31.7	1.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	41.7	100.0
1951				
Working peasants' farms	**	72.5	46.9	66.9
Kulak farms	**	10.1	66.2	13.2
Socialist sector	26.0	17.4	58.2	19.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	50.8	100.0
1952				
Working peasants' farms	**	69.6	41.7	61.4
Kulak farms	**	5.5	61.0	7.2
Socialist sector	34.5	24.9	59.6	31.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	47.4	100.0

* *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953.
** Data unavailable.

greater trade with the cities. The drastic economic reforms initiated during the summer of 1953 were part of a frantic effort to correct this imbalance, an imbalance pronounced in Hungary and terribly aggravated by the disastrous 1952 harvest.

ROMANIA

The Romanian Government has been more secretive about internal market relations than any other Satellite, making conclusions even more difficult to draw. The "Socialist sector," including the "primitive" agricultural associations, comprise 25 per cent of the arable land. According to Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, this sector produces no more than 25 per cent of the total crop,[60] no more than its proportionate share of the arable land. This suggests that the

[60] Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953.

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"Socialist sector," despite its advantages, has given little benefit to the State in terms of marketed produce. The Romanian Council of Ministers frequently complains, as it did on January 28, 1952, that "in spite of all the important benefits given to the peasantry by the State . . . the market was not sufficiently supplied with agricultural products necessary to consumers and to industrial production."[61]

Yugoslavia

The history of collectivization in Yugoslavia is so complex, and differs in so many respects from the course followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that comparisons are difficult. However, in certain fundamental respects, the initial collectivization drive (1948-1950) had the same goals as those guiding the Cominform bloc. No data on produce marketed are available; but production data indicate that in the years of collectivizing, the Government was successful at least in obtaining higher yields on its State and collective farms than from the private sector, and presumably was able to extract a large portion of that yield from the farms. Undoubtedly, this result was due in part to the ability of the Yugoslav regime to collectivize the fertile Vojvodina region (see Chart VII), where yield per hectare was traditionally high. But the "Socialist sector" also included a good deal of the poor and relatively unproductive land of Macedonia, and therefore Table 33, in which the proportion of grain produced by each sector is compared with the proportion of land held, is significant.

Overall Market Perspective

Despite the sparseness and frequent unreliability of the statistical data employed in this analysis, some conclusions may be drawn.

1. In varying degrees, depending upon the country, collectivization in Eastern Europe has actually expedited extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside at the low price consistent with Communist industrial designs. While the system of compulsory deliveries at State-regulated prices was effective to this end, it left enough initiative and power in the hands of the peasantry to hamper the development of industry.

In Bulgaria collectivization results are the most impressive; in Czechoslovakia the gains are less impressive, but still significant. In Poland the regime has had to rely a great deal upon the surplus

[61] *Scanteia*, January 29, 1952.

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TABLE 33

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA – 1948 - 1951*
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

(In percent of total production)

Year	Sector	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total**	Percent of Arable Land***
1948/49	State	2.3	1.8	7.4	8.5	3.4	3.0
	Cooperative	14.2	11.6	15.1	16.4	14.4	10.0
	Private	83.5	86.6	77.5	75.1	82.2	87.0
1949/50	State	3.2	2.0	14.5	12.4	5.0	4.0
	Cooperative	23.2	24.0	25.4	28.7	23.9	16.0
	Private	73.6	74.0	60.1	58.9	71.1	80.0
1950/51	State	2.8	2.4	17.4	14.5	5.5	4.0
	Cooperative	25.3	28.4	28.3	30.0	26.3	19.0
	Private	71.9	69.2	54.3	55.5	68.2	77.0

* *Bulletin of Information and Documents*, (Belgrade), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1952, pp. 21-26.

** The total is derived from the combined tonnage of the wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Since the caloric value of a ton of wheat is greater than a ton of barley or oats, combining them all in one sum is deceptive. However, for the purposes of the above comparison the rough approximation of the "total" given, based entirely on tonnage, is sufficient. If potato production had been included in this table, then a caloric measurement such as the FAO used in establishing its "Wheat Equivalent Unit" (See Chart XIII) might have been employed, since the caloric content of a given weight of potatoes is only one-fifth that of an equivalent weight of wheat, whereas barley and oats are three-fifths.

*** The figures given for arable land in this table are estimates. Since grain production is given according to the agricultural year and the progress of collectivization according to the calendar year, it was necessary to interpolate the latter figures to accord with the former.

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production of State Farms rather than the collectives, and, as in Hungary, kulaks and middle farmers continue to constitute a major source of marketable produce. In Romania the positive results of collectivization appear to be negligible, and, consistently enough, its industrial expansion has been quite modest. And in Hungary collectivization seems to have aggravated an already critical town-country relationship. But even in Hungary, and to a lesser extent Romania, the degree of peasant exploitation was sufficient to insure considerable urban development.

2. At the same time, it must be stressed, the evidence indicates that collectivization was by no means as successful as it was in the Soviet Union. This seems to be true both quantitatively (in terms of percentage of arable land absorbed) and qualitatively (in terms of reorientation of the market). It was not sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to facilitate the rapid increase in peasant exploitation which, from the regimes' viewpoint, justified the bloodshed and brutality of Communist agrarian policy.

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It might yet be claimed that even these differences in income 000
are smaller than those prevailing in the countries of capitalism based on private property. There is not sufficient statistical information about income distribution in the 'People's Democracies' accurately to check this contention, but some general remarks may be made. To compare the ratio between the income of an American capitalist and his workers on the one hand, with the ratio between the incomes of a manager in the 'People's Democracies' and his workers is to compare two qualitatively different things. Let us assume that the American capitalist gets a million dollars' profit, of which he ploughs back into the enterprise 700 thousand dollars. For his personal consumption he thus takes 300,000 dollars. The boss in the enterprise in the 'People's Democracies', on the other hand, would claim that as he does not own the factory the profits ploughed back into the enterprise must not come out of what he gets, but out of the profit made by the whole of society. If the American capitalist argued that the 700,000 he ploughed back was in the interests of society, the communists would reply that he gets the main benefit from it. But it appears that the same argument must not be applied to bureaucratic state capitalism.

Since a group of people in control of the means of production will take for itself the biggest possible share of the national cake, and as under the rule of the Communist Parties the workers are faced with the most concentrated capital, while they lack the right to defend themselves through democratic organisations independent of their rulers or by strike action, the inequality in incomes will inevitably reach its most extreme forms.

The Workers' Resistance

Reference has already been made to the way in which the 468
workers of Czechoslovakia expressed their rising dissatisfaction 475
with the Communist Party leaders by rejecting the official list of candidates to Works Committees in 1947, thus driving the Party to abolish the secret ballot.[1] But the workers found other ways of expressing their dissatisfaction, the most important being greatly increased absenteeism, which reached the proportions of an epidemic in Czechoslovakian industry. At

[1] [See category IIC, pp 84-85 -- Analyst]

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468 475 the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Slansky, the General Secretary, disclosed that whereas before the war absenteeism in the foundries totalled 2.4-3.5 per cent, it had risen in January, 1949, to 12 per cent and in March to 15 per cent. The position was even more critical in the building industry: in the four principal building undertakings in the Morawská Ostrawa district alone 53,420 working-shifts had been lost, while another building enterprise at Tábor registered 50 per cent of absentees. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, May, 1949). On September 21st, 1949, Premier Zapotocky told the Czechoslovak Trade Union Council that absenteeism among the workers so far that year was already more than 37 per cent higher than in 1947. (*Lidové Noviny*, 22nd September, 1949). Even the National Assembly's decision of 24th March, 1950 to deduct from the holiday days missed without good reason would probably not altogether stop this expression of the increasing 'enthusiasm' of the workers for the regime.

It is not only the Czechoslovak workers who put up some resistance, however limited it must be by the totalitarian character of the regime. *The Times* of 5th September, 1949, gave a report from its correspondent in Budapest of a conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest—in which more than 60 per cent of Hungary's industry is concentrated—which was attended by all the foremost leaders of the Party. 'The report (of the Conference) says that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between February and July it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17 per cent . . .' 'Far too many workers were applying for sick relief—in a recent week in one factory 11 per cent, in another 12 per cent. Instances are given of self-inflicted wounds'. Rákosi in his speech claimed that in many factories the number of days missed for sick leave was two to three times higher than before the war. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6th September, 1949). On August 31st, 1949, he said that in the previous few months productivity had fallen by 10-15 per cent.

In Poland an epidemic of absenteeism drove the government to adopt harsh measures. On April 19th, 1950, the Sejm passed a law concerning the 'Socialist discipline of labour.' Extremely heavy punishments are imposed on absentees. A worker who

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has been absent from his work for four or more days in a year without a satisfactory excuse suffers a wage cut of 10-25 per cent which may last for three months.

The Yugoslav workers also use the weapon of absenteeism in their struggle against their bad conditions. *The Times* of 1st November, 1950, quoting the Belgrade trade union paper *Rad*, said: '. . . absenteeism in the coal mines in Serbia reached 19%; Croatia—17½%; Slovenia—15%; and Bosnia-Herzegovina—14%. The plan allowed for a maximum absenteeism of 11%.' In his speech to the Federal Assembly on 17th April, 1950, Tito said:' In 1949, there was a 26.26% loss in working time. In Croatia, this percentage reached 33%, of which 21% was spent in holiday-taking and absenteeism. This proves the weak struggle for discipline . . . ' The workers also frequently change their place of work. In a speech to the Serbian parliament, Jovan Vesilinov, Vice-Premier of Serbia, reported that during ten months of 1949 state enterprises in Serbia took on 628,064 persons but lost 430,050 workers who had left their jobs. (*The New York Times*, 29th January, 1950). *Borba* of 21st August, 1950, stated that in the Trepcha lead mines and refinery—one of the largest in the world—some 11,000 workers were taken on in 1949, of whom 10,500 left before the end of the year because of very bad conditions, irregular pay 'usually between the fifteenth and twentieth of the month, often between the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth', and the irregular distribution of the rations (in August the rations were distributed ten days late, and in the meantime the workers had to do without bread).

The Government took strong measures to fight against absenteeism and the frequent changes in the place of work. On 26 January, 1950, it passed a decree stating that food ration cards would be withdrawn from persons leaving their place of employment without permission, and no new cards would be issued them. The decree further stated that a clause might be included in labour contracts obliging a worker to reimburse the enterprise for any loss in production resulting from his unjustifiable absenteeism.

Another symptom of the increasing dissatisfaction of the workers is the decline in the *quality* of what they produce. For example, in the speech quoted above, Rákosi stated that the

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468 475 percentage of waste in the Manfred Weiss iron foundry, the second biggest metal factory in Hungary, had risen from 10.4 to 23.5 per cent. In Poland, in 1948, of 67 million tons of coal, 1,100,000 tons were stones; in 1949 the percentage of stones in the coal reached 5 per cent. In 1948 and 1949 a sizeable proportion of the exports of Czechoslovakia—the country with the reputation for products of good quality—was returned as below standard.

The admonitions of the leaders to the workers are often of such a character as to leave no doubt about their indocility. Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, said in a speech at Debrecen on December 6th, 1948, that 'The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalised industries', and he threatened them with forced labour.

Chivu Stoica, Rumanian Minister of Industry, addressing the workers of the Resita plant, the largest metallurgical establishment in the country, on December 25th, 1948, accused them of not having fulfilled the plan and of being 'capitalist agents'.

In Yugoslavia, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party (July, 1948), attacked those workers who showed 'resistance to realistic norms, against competition, and on the other hand—in exaggerated demands in regard to pay'. 'It is clear that the consequences of such a stand are a decrease in work discipline, insufficient aid to rationalisers and innovators in the realization and application of their proposals, an incorrect and unfriendly attitude toward the heads of the enterprise, an incorrect attitude toward competitions'. (*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for New Yugoslavia, for People's Authority and for Socialism*, Belgrade, 1948, pp. 87-8).

466 That the workers nevertheless remain members of the Communist Parties—as the official statistics show—is not because of their enthusiasm for them, but because it is too dangerous to leave. Anyone who leaves the Party faces the threat of economic sanctions (at least). This is shown clearly by some figures issued in October, 1948, by József Révai, editor of *Szabad Nép*, the Hungarian Communist Party daily. He says that the paper is read by only 12 per cent of the Party members. At the big M.A.U.A.G. factories, for example, where 6,000